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WHAT DO WE DO WITH AFRICAN COMMUNALISM? 

Ike Odimegwu 

 &  

Christopher Ogugua 

Department of Philosophy 

Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka 

ikennaodimegwu@gmail.com 

 

Abstract 

If the development of Africa shall be founded on African philosophy, the foundations of African 

philosophy must be strong, dynamic and clearly articulated.  Communalism is arguably one of 

the cornerstones of African Philosophy. It has variously constituted foundation for African 

philosophy, framework for African personhood and touchstone for African identity. A number 

of African nationalist leaders sought to build the socio-political and economic structures of 

their nascent independent states on communalism. In the heat of the struggles, the exuberance 

of emergence and the confusion of neocolonialism, many scholars have made many claims for 

communalism that have evoked diverse critical reactions. While a number of the claims are 

difficult to substantiate, some of the reactions have also been extreme. Social life in post-

independence African societies has also called to question the non-periodized claims on behalf 

of communalism. The undifferentiating reference to traditional mode of living, current social 

reality and/or philosophic notions and concepts of communalism has introduced much 

confusion in the discourse of communalism in African philosophy. This paper undertakes 

conceptual dialogue with the various participants in the African communalism symposium in 

order to unpack the confusion of reference and ascertain what foundation and service 

communalism as an African philosophy can constitute for and render to the present and future 

of African development. 

Keywords: Communalism, African communalism, African philosophy, foundations of 

philosophy, development. 

 

Introduction 

The very first challenge that confronted advocates of the existence of African Philosophy 

during the Great Debate was the problem of identity, that is, what is specifically African about 

African Philosophy? In the works of many African philosophers in that Debate, communalism 

was implicated as one of the principal elements that distinguish Africa on the one hand and 

African Philosophy from other traditions of philosophy on the other hand. Thus, communalism 

has variously constituted foundation for African philosophy, framework for African 

personhood and touchstone for African identity. It was in this context that a number of African 

mailto:ikennaodimegwu@gmail.com


 
 

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nationalist leaders sought to build the socio-political and economic structures of their nascent 

independent states on communalism. In the heat of the struggles, the exuberance of emergence 

and the confusion of neocolonialism, many scholars have made many claims for communalism 

that have evoked diverse critical reactions. While a number of the claims are difficult to 

substantiate, some of the reactions have also been extreme. In addition, certain manifestations 

of socio-political life in post-independence Africa such as leadership failure, economic 

corruption authoritarianism, one-party system, self-perpetuation in power, human rights abuse, 

the continuing failure of liberal democracy, tribal conflicts and ethnic acrimonies have called 

into question the non-periodized claims of the African communalism exponents. The 

undifferentiating discourse of communalism in reference to traditional social life, current social 

reality and/or philosophic concept notions and concepts has introduced much confusion in the 

discourse.  

Therefore, while African scholars such as Uduigwomen (2002, p. 3) may have been correct 

that the debate on whether or not there is an African philosophy is dead and buried, the 

controversy surrounding aspects of these debates is far from settled as confusion has continued 

to dog such defining elements of the Debate and the philosophy like communalism.  Hence, 

this paper undertakes conceptual dialogue with the various participants in the symposium on 

African communalism in order to unpack the confusion of reference and ascertain what 

foundation and service communalism as an African philosophy can constitute for and render to 

the present and future of African development. 

 

African Communalism and Controversies 

The history of communalism in Africa like the history of philosophy itself is punctuated with 

controversies. The controversies stem from variety of sources and causes: the nature, concept 

and practice of communalism, the relevance and resilience of communalism in the context of 

colonialism and neocolonialism, the reality, status and currency of communalism in the 

changing contexts of African social existence and the impact of communalism on the vexed 

issues of enduring social crisis, political stability and development in Africa. However, the 

massive attention and the consequent controversies surrounding African communalism are not 

surprising since the definitions of African Philosophy, African identity and African personhood 

from onset have been tied to communalism. There are a number of specific areas of these 

controversies that are of interest to this paper. The first is whether communalism is specific to 

Africa or common to all primitive societies. The second is whether the communalism of 

traditional African society is still relevant to contemporary Africa. The third is whether it is 

legitimate to talk about African communalism considering the diverse nature of Africa cultures. 

The fourth surrounds the justification for the frequent claim that African traditional society is 

communalist. This section will be devoted to discussing these debates and controversies. 

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The controversy on whether it is legitimate to generalize communalism for all of Africa centers 

around the diversity African cultures. Commenting on this, Onwuejeogwu (cited in Okafor & 

Emeka, 1998, p. 20) makes the argument that: 

 In Africa there are over a thousand ethnic groups, each having its own culture, 

but these have been broadly divided into eleven culture areas namely: Hottentot, 

Bushman, East African cattle, Western cattle, the Congo, the Guinea Coast, the 

East Horn, East Sudan, West Sudan, Egyptian, and Mediterranean. Each of these 

may be divided into sub-culture areas. 

 Although, Onwuejelogwu, did not embark on the categorization of these sub-cultural groups, 

the point he tries to emphasize is that Africa is a continent of many cultures. The question 

therefore is whether it is legitimate to claim that communalism is a feature of these very widely 

diversified African cultures?   

A number of scholars have argued that such generalization is legitimate. Onwuejelogwu (Ibid. 

p. 75) after conceding the diversity of African culture still argue that “The differences and 

cultural diversities in Africa notwithstanding, there are enough similarities among these 

cultures that legitimizes us to talk about the entity ‘African culture’” He identifies four areas 

where this harmony is most obvious: the whole aspects of African cosmology, African 

communalism, African ethical belief system and burial rites. These among other practices are 

common among all African societies. Corroborating Onwuejeogwu, Hannah Kinoti (1999, pp. 

73-82) argues that, although Africa is a vast continent and much fragmented in terms of 

languages, beliefs and customs, there is adequate evidence from various studies that where the 

basics of cultural and moral assumptions are concerned, the bottom line is fairly solid. It is 

therefore possible according to him, to generalize to a large extent. 

However, there are scholars who believe that this type of generalization has no empirical 

support. Olufemi Tiawo (2016, p. 84) in his objection to Ikuenobe’s généralisation of a 

communalist African society raised the following questions: 

 Is it possible that, as a construct of Ikuenobe’s imagination, communalism does 

not describe the empirical state of African societies now or in the past? Might 

one derive a different, maybe even opposed, ‘conceptual normative 

generalization’ from the same empirical data plumbed by Ikuenobe? Are the 

commonalities cited as the base for his generalization what he has cashed them 

out to be? Despite all the caveats, Ikuenobe’s account still strikes me as just 

another way of affirming a problematic stance: that most of what are styled 

‘traditional African societies’ were communalist…the idea of ‘traditional 

African society’ is problematic, to say the least; most likely, as a theoretical 

concept, it is vacuous. For the case can be made that most of the commonalities 

that are often trumpeted as typifying African cultures are not peculiarly, 

predominantly, not to say solely, African.  



 
 

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In this context, Taiwo contends that Africans need to abandon the legacy of colonial-inflected 

anthropology that lumps together several social types that serious study should easily make 

clear do not belong together. How communalistic could the medieval Mali Empire have been? 

The Ọ̀yọ́ Empire was a multinational polity that had within its borders different national and 

ethnic groups. On what basis could one affirm of 17th century Ọ̀yọ́ with its hierarchies— 

including an aristocracy and monarchy that lived off the surplus labor of others—and a complex 

division of labor that it was a so-called “traditional society”?  

Meanwhile, in the various communities that made up Igbo people, their scholars 

and ideologists love to trumpet their traditional preference for republicanism 

and their storied individualism. Yet, scholars love to talk of traditional Igbo 

society and affirm communalism of it in the singular (p. 85).  

The important point then is that Africa is too culturally diverse to be talked about generically 

and that this type of blanket generalization deprives the cultures in Africa the benefits of 

thorough and rigorous analysis that would have helped not only in diagnosing the problems of 

the various cultures in the continent but also needed to move it forward. 

Scholars have also debated on whether communalism is peculiar to traditional African society 

or is generally the characteristic of all primitive societies. For instance, it has been claimed that 

communalism as a universal idea shares a strong conceptual affiliation with terms such as 

socialism and humanism with roots going back to Plato‘s political theory, the communal life 

of the early Christians, the French revolution engineered by the encyclopaedists who aimed at 

rationalizing society, down to Marx/Engel‘s utopian and scientific socialism. The bottom line 

in this affiliation is that the emphasis on the importance of community in the functioning, the 

analysis and the understanding of human dignity and wellbeing is universal and therefore not 

peculiar to any group of people (Martin, et al., 1977). 

Nevertheless, as P. M. Martin, et al (1977) claim, Africans, were organized sometimes more 

communally in ways which were unfamiliar to others and unwitnessed anywhere else. 

Therefore, although all human beings are said to be social, there seem to be some unanimity 

among African philosophers, that Africans exhibited some sort of sociality that was both unique 

and more than the normal expected level of sociality. In fact, for H., Kimmerle (1989), this 

level of sociality was both unique and transcendental. Kimmerle argues that the notions of 

Ubuntu and communalism are not used for instrumental purposes as in the West. According to 

him, in ubuntu which is a form of African communalism, the African community spirit is 

epitomized. This implies that there is a high estimation of the community in African thought 

and practice, higher than that of the individual, but not at the cost of forgetting the individual 

person. This is so because a person is a person in the context of community. Thus the special 

relationship communalism has in Africa is coloured by African culture most importantly in 

granting mutual help, caring for each other and sharing with each other by means of dialogues.  

However, some scholars such as Tiawo remain unconvinced about the uniqueness of African 

communalism. Taiwo (2016, p. 85) argues: 

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The contrast between the Western and the African is hardly ever illuminating; 

often the obscure and this should not come as a surprise: it frequently is 

motivated by the need to affirm African difference. Outside of this overarching 

need to treat the West as a monolith in order thereby to affirm Africa in its 

radical difference, this cannot be a very plausible idea unless it can be shown 

that communalism, even of the variety that Ikuenobe defends, is not part of the 

philosophical history of the so-called West. Certainly, given that many of us 

African scholars engaged in this debate are native speakers of the so-called 

Western philosophical idiom, we can assert that we know that not too dissimilar 

versions of communalism are significant parts of the Western tradition. 

Tiawo’s substantive claim here is that there is not enough evidence to show that the version of 

African communalism defended by Africanists is different from the versions in other parts of 

the world. He maintained that communalism can be affirmed of much of the human race and 

various societies at different times in the past whether in Europe, Asia, Africa, or America.  

But if this is true, then a special case needs to be made for the legitimacy of the 

affirmation and deployment of African communalism. The Greeks worshipped 

mountains, found gods everywhere, and insisted that a being-out-of-community 

must be a god or a beast. They also held that the group is prior to the 

individual… The contrast between Africa and Europe is badly drawn and likely 

to obfuscate rather than illuminate the nature of societies and the individuals 

that make them up. Have African societies always been ‘community societies’ 

and European societies ‘collectivist’ ones? (p. 85). 

In other words, communalism’s pedigree is not traced to geography or history of any particular 

people. It is rather to be sought in the modes of production of material life. If this is so, 

communalism is distributed across cultures and peoples who are otherwise distinct and 

different in their cultural productions would share communalism insofar as their modes of 

production are the same or very similar. Therefore, “Communalism is widely diffused across 

the globe from Europe to Asia and the Americas at specific historical conjunctures.” 

Furthermore, while such scholars as John Mbiti, Sender Senghor and a whole lot of others were 

convinced that African traditional society was decidedly communalistic, there were scholars 

who contest this claim. Parrinder (1969, p. 90) for example mentioned that African past was 

not a heaven of perfections. It had its own problems and limitations. He writes: 

It is easy to idealise the past and sign for an imaginary golden age away from 

the disturbing present with its rapacious commerce, oppressive politics and 

bitter warfare. The facts are that even in the past there were unpleasant customs, 

tyrannical rulers, sudden deaths and human sacrifices. 

Based on this some scholars have gone as far as denying that traditional African society was 

communalist.  For Nkrumah (1967), an idyllic African classless society (in which there were 

no rich no poor) enjoying a drugged serenity is certainly a facile simplification; there is no 



 
 

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historical or even anthropological evidence for any such society. Defending his ground against 

a classless African traditional society, Nkrumah points out that feudalism, a deep and 

exploitative social stratification founded on the ownership of land, existed in some parts of 

Africa before colonization. He further noted that slavery existed in Africa before European 

colonization. Before colonization Nkrumah insists, Africans were prepared to sell, often for no 

more than thirty pieces of silver, fellow tribesmen and even members of the same extended 

family and clan. V. G. Simiyu (Cited in Kimmerle, 1989, p. 30) cautions against what he 

describes as exaggerations of African traditional socialism. “How do we defend equality of 

people in traditional Africa face–to-face with innumerable beggars, homeless people, 

unattended sickly people that populated that epoch?” 

While the picture painted above may apply to some African communities, it raises some issues. 

For one, equality does not presuppose the non-existence of social classes. What may be posited 

against equality would rather be the institutionalization of such classes. That there are beggars, 

homeless people, and the sick questions charity rather than equality. And of course, charity or 

rather fellow-feeling, lies at the heart of African communalism. Where such is lacking 

therefore, it must be noted as minus for the claims for African communalism. That there would 

be such situations is only to be expected. To generalize on such situations would require further 

evidence and proof than mere assertion. And the picture does not seem to describe the history 

of the pre-colonial Igbo societies with well-developed structures for taking care of the class of 

people captured in the picture at the family level.  

Differing from what he regards as democratic myth in African traditional societies, Simiyu 

(2017) draws attention to the fact that hate and struggle were not unknown in these societies. 

Moreover, to presuppose one and the same structure everywhere proves to be a too simplistic 

way of speaking about traditional social life in Africa. While it is obvious and trite that the land 

where “everyone lived peacefully and joyfully thereafter” belongs only to the realm of mythical 

imaginations, Simiyu also fell into the ‘simplistic way of speaking’ in the earlier passage where 

the existence of ‘beggars, homeless people, unattended sickly people’ in some African societies 

is generalized to refute the existence of communalism in precolonial African societies.   

There are also critics who accept that traditional African societies were communalistic but fault 

any attempt to extrapolate this into contemporary African life. The claim here is that the type 

of brotherhood and hospitality practiced in traditional African society is limited within small 

units, usually the tribe which makes it a source of animosity and ethnic tension. According to 

Ali Mazrui (1978, p. 25), “The fact that Africans have a highly developed sense of 

responsibility towards their own kinsmen, has reduced their capacity to empathise with those 

that are not their own. The fact here is that strong tribal brotherhood easily results in 

isolationism among different ethnic groups?” 

Ejiogu (2014, p. 6) identifies this type of ethnic affiliation as the root cause of many African 

problems: 

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We cannot, while defending the so termed African’s natural propensity to 

brotherhood, keep blind eyes over chronic tribal hatred that contoured African 

traditional communities and have continued to torment the African continent. 

We habitually associate racism with the westerners, but a deep insight into the 

lifestyle of traditional African communities would reveal that Africans are the 

most racist groups in the world. Tribalism is the chief operational factor in the 

African continent right from its history. Language and some particular forms of 

culture distinguish tribes in Africa. Each African tribe would preferably choose 

to live, interact and inter-marry within their respective territorial confines 

without interfering with others and each tribe would do whatever it entails to 

defend her geographical location and ontological tribal identity and purity 

against all other tribes. It is this strong sense of tribal descent, unity and the 

compelling instinct of defending tribal historical cultural identity that is at the 

root of tribal intolerance in Africa. 

 

Ogbuja (2007, pp. 22-23) on his own, sees this as the reason why democracy has failed to 

work in Africa. He describes poignantly: 

African communalism engenders a high sense of hospitality, communality and 

altruism for one’s ethnic group. At this level, the different sub-cultural groups 

organize themselves independently of each other. Beyond the immediate 

community, there is neither loyalty nor compelling force of authority. Driven by 

the urge to satisfy the needs of her immediate members, each community 

competes with others for the scarce resources of nature. Often, the competition 

leads to confrontation, and confrontation to crisis.  

The preponderance of communal conflicts among the traditional Africans is consequent upon 

this. The high rate of instability in the art of governance within African nations is ultimately 

traceable to this. This ‘communal idea’ brings with it a community consciousness, a 

consciousness that sees the communities fighting in and through their individual members. 

Each time an individual is placed in a position of leadership, he sees himself first as a member 

of a specific community whose primary task is to promote his communal selfhood, before 

anything else. In doing so, he gives undue preference to issues pertaining to his primal 

community, while the problems of other segments of the same society are treated with levity. 

It is a ‘winner-take-all’ jungle society. This form of injustice and alienation of people from their 

main purpose of living together can only but give rise to uprisings, sabotaging of government 

policies, coups and counter coups, and various forms of dissension that lead to instability in 

governance. 

 

 



 
 

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How Communalist is Africa? 

At the centre of all the controversies discussed so far is the question of what advocates exactly 

mean when they claim that Africans are communalist. Ike Odimegwu (2007) indicated the 

various ways this question can be formulated:  

The question, how communalist is Africa, may be understood in various ways. 

What, for instance, is communalism?  Is there a generally accepted concept or 

definition of communalism?  Are there brands of communalism?  Are there 

levels, types or kinds of communalism?   If there are, which is the ideal or 

perfect communalism? 

The problem that confronts attempts to address this question is that very rarely do advocates of 

African communalism advance theories that specify whether there are brands of communalism 

or not and the specific version of these brands a particular scholar is proposing or defending. 

This lack of theorization has been flagged as “the basis for the continued conceptual confusion” 

that has dogged the discourse of African communalism. 

However, scholars like Oguejiofor and Tiawo have developed conceptual schemas that are very 

helpful in navigating through the conceptual confusion engendered by the lack of clarity of use 

by advocates of African communalism. Oguejiofor (2007) raises the question: “How African 

is Communalism?” In search of answer to the query, he distinguishes three possible senses in 

which communalism may be African: 1) Communalism characterizes Africa; 2) Communalism 

is specific and exclusive to Africa; 3) Communalism is essential to being African. In the first 

sense, communalism is a quality which Africans possess but this possession does not exclude 

non-Africans from also possessing the same quality. The second sense makes the possession of 

the quality exclusive to Africans or originally theirs such that even if it is found in any other 

group of humans, it follows that they acquired it from Africans. And in the third sense, this 

quality is not just characteristic and exclusive; it defines the essence of being African such that 

not to possess it is not to be African. Oguejiofor argues that while communalism may be African 

in the first sense, it will be erroneous to attribute communalism to Africa in the second and 

third senses. He further argues that many of the conditions that qualified Africa for the first 

sense are no longer available in contemporary African society. 

These critical distinctions are taken further by Taiwo (2016) in an illuminating classification of 

communalism. Against the background of a Babel of contributions on the provenance of 

communalism as the African possession and donation to the world, Taiwo calls attention to the 

many confusions that attend to the usage of the term. He distinguishes three theses of 

communalism in the extant literature: ontological, methodical and axiological communalism. 

According to Taiwo, literature in the first category, the ontological, expresses communalism as 

a thesis about how humans are in the world and what they are. On this reading, being-in-

communion is the natural way of being human. A human being who is outside of this 

community communion will, ex-definitione, be a non-human. Taiwo contends that many who 

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canvass communalism in the African context subscribe to this thesis. The claim is that being-

in-community is the quintessential way of being African. 

Methodological communalism is the thesis that no matter how humans are in the world, the 

best place to make sense of their being-in-the-world and their activities attached thereto is to 

view them through the prism of community. This thesis for Taiwo is an explanatory model and 

the claim is that the best way to make sense of Africans and their world is to study them within 

or as communal beings. The third, axiological thesis holds that communalism provides a 

yardstick with which to measure the desirability or worth of being-in-the world. Attention here 

turns on value theory. Many of the strictures that communalists place on contemporary 

urbanization-inflected social living and the atomization that characterizes it are on account of 

the individualism that is inspired, supposedly, by Africans copying Western values. 

Individualist behaviour is excoriated and those who embrace it, however it is conceived, stand 

condemned for abandoning a superior mode of social living: communalism. Taiwo (2016, p. 

82) further divides axiological communalism into two categories: communalist ethics and 

communalist social and political philosophy or socio-political communalism. 

If what is to be judged is behaviour or conduct, we call it communalist ethics. 

If, however, what is to be judged is the suitability of modes of governance or 

principles of social living or ordering, resolving issues of who ought to rule 

when not all can rule and what end legitimate rule should tend to, we call it 

communalist social and political philosophy or socio-political communalism. 

Socio-political communalism will be important in the design of social institutions or what 

political institutions are most likely to ensure a better life for humans. Taiwo avers that it is 

easy to see how one who thinks that the system is too individualist would prefer communalism. 

In the political arena, one can trace much of the preference of African philosophers for one-

party regimes or consensus politics to this preference for communalist arrangements. They may 

be taken as instances of socio-political communalism.  

Tiawo correctly observed that the literature on communalism scarcely, if ever, evinces any 

awareness of the distinctions just made. The result is a lot of confusion as to what exactly is at 

issue in these disquisitions. Identifying and distinguishing these different theses of 

communalism can illuminate a discussion that is often notorious for its murkiness. For 

example, the ontological thesis can be defended on several grounds, including conceptual and 

empirical ones. Because it is not recognized as such, many who canvass it seem to be offering 

empirical grounds for it. Yet, it is clear that historically it is less true of many African societies, 

especially those that evolved great civilizations. One could also advance communalist ethics 

but not defend it on empirical but ahistorical grounds as is usually done in the literature. What 

is more, by so championing communalism, it will be easier to address the main objective of 

this paper, namely, what do we do with communalism? 

 

 



 
 

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What do we do with Communalism Today? 

From the foregoing, it should be obvious that one of the first things to do with communalism 

today is to insist on conceptual clarification. The three categories of Oguejiofor and Taiwo are 

steps in this direction. Further development in this direction will be positive development. It 

will also amount to useful engagement with communalism if any further proposition of 

communalism pays heed to these conceptual clarifications and applies the clarifications already 

achieved while striving to improve on the status quo. Again, the forgetfulness of history or the 

deliberate revision of history, a natural tendency of conquerors, imperialists and colonialists, 

has led to untoward distortion of history and untold harm to human societies and humanity 

generally. It behooves every people therefore to seek knowledge and possession of their history 

and as well as to struggle for the rewriting of their revised history. However, this 

historiographical responsibility imposes a further philosophic duty of critical engagement with 

the historicity of a people’s historical claims. That is, the need to know who I am calls up the 

further need to question, again and again, who I am or claim to be. Therefore, the quest to know 

whether Africans were communalist and the nature of African communalism, as have 

punctuated the controversies of African communalism, are very important and may not, in the 

foreseeable future, be dismissed as irrelevant or anachronistic. What to do with African 

communalism in this regard should be insistent inquiry into the identity or identities that this 

mode of existence had conferred and may yet confer on the African people as part of a 

conscious campaign of self-definition, recognition and possession.  

In summary therefore, to the question, what do we do with African communalism today, we 

can do three things or a number of things at three levels: we can undertake an involved and 

involving conceptual engagement with African communalism to achieve conceptual clarity; we 

can sieve the realistic from the idealistic and yet seek how the ideal can inspire and guide, 

motivate and activate the real to transit the engagement with African communalism from idle 

contending for identity to constructive action for development; we can then apply the 

instrument thus acquired to the development of integral and progressive African institutions, 

structures and operations. Whatever, we do, a necessary test of validity and relevance of the 

process and instrument developed from the process should include their resilience in the face 

of competing instruments in the global arena; their contribution or relevance to the 

development of Africa and Africans; their impact on the confidence of the African in the global 

village.  

 

Conclusion 

Communalism has continued to exercise overarching influence on the African social and 

intellectual space so much so that it is difficult to escape its ubiquity. It has been employed by 

African social theorists, nationalist campaigners, political leaders and scholars. This work has 

studied the prevalence of communalism as a social issue, political instrument and philosophic 

discourse. This prevalence has attracted proponents, detractors and critics. It has generated 

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many controversies. In this paper, we have addressed the controversies bordering on whether 

communalism is specific to Africa or common to all primitive societies; whether the 

communalism of traditional African society is still relevant to contemporary Africa; whether it 

is legitimate to talk about African communalism considering the diverse nature of Africa 

cultures and even the justification for the claim that traditional society is communalist. 

Having discussed the positions and contributions of scholars in these controversies, we 

examined the current reality of African society and the status of communalism in this society 

with a focus on the direction that attention and discussion of African communalism should 

adopt in order to be useful for the identity and development of the African as well as for his/her 

meaningful contribution to the world. This examination threw up the finding that whatever, 

may be done, a necessary first step is conceptual clarity. We noted that Oguejiofor and Taiwo 

have started out in this direction and that scholarship on African communalism will gain by 

continuing in this direction both in the activity of conceptual clarification and in the consistent 

application of the achieved clarifications. 

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What Do We Do With African Communalism? -    Ike Odimegwu & Christopher Ogugua 

 


